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Domestic technologyThe residential housing sector is a major consumer of energy accounting for approximately one third of
carbon emissions in the United Kingdom. Achieving a sustainable, low-carbon infrastructure necessitates
a reduced and more efﬁcient use of domestic energy supplies. Energy service companies offer an alterna-
tive to traditional providers, which supply a single utility product to satisfy the unconstrained demand of
end users, and have been identiﬁed as a potentially important actor in sustainable future economies. An
agent-based model is developed to examine the potential of energy service companies to contribute to
the large scale upgrading of household energy efﬁciency, which would ultimately lead to a more sustain-
able and secure energy infrastructure. The migration of households towards energy service companies is
described by an attractiveness array, through which potential customers can evaluate the future beneﬁts,
in terms of household energy costs, of changing provider. It is shown that self-ﬁnancing is a limiting fac-
tor to the widespread upgrading of residential energy efﬁciency. Greater reductions in household energy
costs could be achieved by committing to longer term contracts, allowing upgrade costs to be distributed
over greater time intervals. A steadily increasing cost of future energy usage lends an element of stability
to the market, with energy service companies displaying the ability to retain customers on contract expi-
ration. The model highlights how a greater focus on the provision of energy services, as opposed to con-
sumable products, presents a viable approach to reducing future energy costs and usage.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
All households require energy to attain a desired level of com-
fort and a basic standard of heating, lighting and hot water. Indi-
vidual requirements vary by house type (e.g. size, construction)
and occupancy. Rising energy prices due to the depletion of natural
resources and environmental policies have led to increased pres-
sure to reduce and optimise consumption [1]. In addition, concerns
about environmental sustainability have intensiﬁed efforts to
reduce global carbon emissions. Globally, housing is a major con-
sumer of energy and in the UK residential dwellings account for
approximately 30% of CO2 emissions [2] while the service sector,
which incorporates all commercial and public buildings, accounts
for only 11% [3]. Enhancing the energy efﬁciency of this housing
stock could greatly contribute to the potential global energy reduc-
tions attainable in this sector [4], while also addressing the burden
of rising energy prices by reducing annual utility costs.
Energy is supplied to end-users through an established physical
network, which co-exists and operates in parallel with other utilitynetworks (e.g. water, communications), collectively composing the
national infrastructure [5]. Households achieve their desired level
of comfort (e.g. temperature, hot water, personal device usage)
by purchasing energy from utility companies that supply products
such as electricity and gas. Traditionally, consumers receive each
individual utility through a product speciﬁc infrastructure system
and pay the relevant supplier for the quantity of product con-
sumed. This system operates on the implicit assumption of contin-
ually meeting the unconstrained demand of the consumer. The
responsibility for sourcing, installing and maintaining all appli-
ances is assumed by the consumer, who also takes full responsibil-
ity for any energy saving activities, either by purchasing more
energy efﬁcient technologies or through individual actions.
The need to reduce and optimise energy usage, while maintaining
household requirements and minimising carbon outputs, has led to
more integrated approaches being adopted for energy provision
services. This need has seen the development of Energy Service
Companies (ESCOs) [6], which have been promoted by legislative
measures at both the national and European levels [7]. Such
companies provide energy services to the end-user, with services
varying from guaranteed savings on the cost of energy to the
installation, operation and maintenance of electrical equipment
[8].
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plex and interdependent barriers at consumer, manufacturer,
ﬁnancial and government levels [9]. In parallel, improvements
can be accelerated by a better understanding of the drivers that
push increased energy efﬁciency, such as consumer awareness,
price and technology [10]. Improved building efﬁciency can be
achieved through the installation of new technologies, such as
improved heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems
[11] or window alternatives [12], in addition to changing resident’s
attitudes and behaviours [13]. ESCOs, by offering an alternative to
the traditional energy provider, could play an important role in
promoting more efﬁcient energy usage [6] by providing a service
(e.g. thermal comfort) rather than an unconstrained quantity of a
measurable resource (such as gas or electricity). As such, the needs
of consumers can be satisﬁed at reduced costs, reduced levels of
energy usage and in a more sustainable fashion. Overcoming the
existing barriers will require technology and policy changes that
recognise the interdependence and interconnectedness of existing
infrastructure systems. At the domestic level, energy reductions at
the scale of individual devices or appliances offer only incremental
improvements in overall efﬁciency and a building level approach,
in terms of both energy management and human behaviour, may
provide greater opportunities for increased reductions [14]. In
the UK, there is an aging household population, with more than
77% of current houses being built before 1980 [15]. The current
housing stock numbers approximately 27.6 million and less than
180,000 new structures are built each year [16]. This indicates that
upgrading the efﬁciency performance of existing households
would be required to substantially reduce energy consumption in
the near future.
Agent-based models are increasingly being used to model and
analyse the complex nature of infrastructure systems [17], with
energy efﬁciency receiving notable attention [18]. In such models,
agents are independent entities (e.g. people, households, busi-
nesses) capable of interacting with each other and adapting to
changes in their environment [19]. The concept of the economy
as a complex system of interacting economic and human agents
is well established [20] and has been applied to the emergence of
technological innovations across the infrastructure domain, for
example water-saving technologies [21] and hybrid electric vehi-
cles [22]. Agent-based models applied to energy service innova-
tions and the adoption of new technologies has also received
attention in the literature [23]. Improvements in energy efﬁciency
at the building level are inﬂuenced by both energy management
and human behaviour [14], and the ability to represent individual
actions and decisions provided by the agent framework is a valu-
able tool in modelling the evolving nature of consumer behaviour
and its impact on energy systems. The impact of this individualistic
behaviour is evident in the UK where, in the six years from 2007 to
2013, mean domestic electricity bills have increased by 39% and
household gas bills by an astonishing 65% [24]. While rising energy
costs undoubtedly contribute to this, consumer behaviour is also
implicit, with the average number of electronic and computing
devices per household increasing by a factor of 6 between 1980
and 2011 [2]. Therefore, improved household energy performance
can only be achieved through a combination of technological
improvements and behavioural changes. Agent based models are
uniquely positioned to describe such heterogeneous populations.
Individual level factors that may tempt consumers away from tra-
ditional energy providers would include reduced costs, removed
risk of appliance failure and reduced energy consumption, which
would particularly appeal to the more environmentally aware con-
sumer. However, reduced costs are partially achieved by spreading
the ﬁxed cost of upgrading household energy efﬁciency over longer
periods of time which necessitates long term contracts, typically
5–10 years [6]. Consumers could be hesitant to engage in suchprolonged partnerships and may also reject the loss of control
and/or ownership of their utility supplies and appliances.
This paper presents a model for the energy efﬁciency upgrading
of the residential housing sector, through the introduction of
energy service companies. An alternative arrangement to the tradi-
tional provider is considered, whereby all household energy needs
are met by a single provider, the ESCO. An agent-based framework
is implemented, in which household agents interact with energy
provider agents. The ESCO agents supply all energy needs (e.g.
electricity and gas) and are responsible for installing, maintaining
and upgrading existing household energy technologies. The migra-
tion of households towards the ESCO providers is determined from
an attractiveness array, from which the potential beneﬁt of house-
hold upgrades can be weighed. The agent methodology and struc-
ture is presented in Section 2, where the economic actors
(households and energy providers) are formulated and character-
ised. The model implementation and agent behaviours are also
outlined. A market scenario, incorporating a single traditional
energy provider and two distinct ESCO agents, is considered in Sec-
tion 3. The market share achieved by each provider agent is
adopted as the indicator of business success. The performance of
the energy providers is analysed under varying market assump-
tions and business strategies. The model investigates the potential
of the ESCO providers to create business models that compete with
the traditional provider, while increasing the energy efﬁciency of
the residential housing sector.
2. Agent-based model for the energy market
The market dynamics of the interactions between energy pro-
vider companies and the residential household population is mod-
elled. Two distinct types of energy provider are considered. A
traditional provider supplies energy to households through a single
utility (e.g. gas or electricity) and offers no additional energy ser-
vices. Households pay for the energy used and are not tied into a
long term contract. Therefore, such households would assume sole
responsibility for upgrades in energy efﬁciency, through the pur-
chasing and installing of new appliances and insulation. The other
type of energy provider considered, the ESCO, supplies multiple
utilities (e.g. gas and electricity), in addition to managing and
maintaining a customer’s household energy systems. Furthermore,
upgrades in household energy efﬁciency would be undertaken by
the ECSO, with costs repaid by the customer over the duration of
the contracted period. In the agent-based framework, three unique
agents are deﬁned to represent the traditional provider and two
ESCO providers with potentially different business strategies,
which are labelled ESCO A and ESCO B. Energy providers are
indexed by k for k 2 ½1;2;3, denoting the traditional provider,
ESCO A and ESCO B, respectively.
A second agent type is deﬁned to represent the heterogeneous
household population. At any time t, a total of HðtÞ household
agents exist and each of the energy providers supply energy to
HkðtÞ households, such that the total household population is given
by
HðtÞ ¼
X3
k¼1
HkðtÞ:
The household agent population will grow due to construction
at a rate of h new houses per year. The agent construct allows
the heterogeneous characteristics of households to be incorporated
into the market dynamics. A household agent describes the physi-
cal dwelling itself, in addition to the resident population. It is
assumed that dwellings are homogeneous in all aspects (e.g. size,
occupancy) and differ only in their unique energy efﬁciency rating.
In the UK, all residential buildings are evaluated as part of the
Table 1
SAP ratings and bands. Source: [25].
Rating Band
1–20 G
21–38 F
39–54 E
55–68 D
69–80 C
81–91 B
92–100 A
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formance rating [25]. This rating is expressed on a scale of 1–100,
with higher values indicating better performance. Based on this
rating houses are assigned to a band, Table 1. An Energy
Performance Certiﬁcate (EPC) is issued for each dwelling docu-
menting the SAP rating. The mean SAP rating in the UK is 58.5, with
more than 75% of houses in the range 39–68 (bands D and E). For
convenience, 11 levels of energy efﬁciency are constructed
deﬁned for i 2 ½0;10, which represent efﬁciency percentages of
½0%;10%;20%; . . . ;100%. Thus, at any time t, the number of
customers supplied by each company satisﬁes
HkðtÞ ¼
X10
i¼0
Hki ðtÞ for k ¼ 1;2;3:
This structure is used for computational convenience and could
be mapped to the ofﬁcial SAP energy bands given in Table 1.
Each agent type has a number of deﬁning attributes. Energy
providers are distinguished by the duration of the contract they
offer to customers, ck, and the number of staff they employ. Staff
are further segregated into sales, skðtÞ, and service staff pkðtÞ. The
former interact with the household population to gain new cus-
tomers for the company. The latter represents all other staff which
could include the legal and marketing departments, in addition to
the installation and maintenance crews. The business model of the
ESCO, which oversees all customer energy systems, would,
undoubtedly, necessitate a larger service staff than that required
by the traditional provider. Companies gain and lose customers
due to the interaction between household agents and sales staff
from each of the energy providers. Sales are represented by house-
holds moving up efﬁciency levels but remaining with the same
provider (internal sales), or signing up with a different company
(external sales). Thus, the change in the number of customers
signed to a particular company is solely determined from the
external sales. A household agent choosing to upgrade or change
energy provider will sign a contract for ck years and, on expiration,
may remain indeﬁnitely with their current energy provider while
becoming available as a potential customer for other providers.
Therefore, all households are ﬂagged as off-market or on-market,
to represent houses currently under contract to an energy provider
or available for recruitment, respectively. A household ﬂagged as
off-market is further classiﬁed by the duration of time remaining
on the contracted period. Finally, each household is also designated
a status, as inert or active. Inert households will always reject the
possibility of changing their efﬁciency level or energy provider.
These households could represent, for example, dwellings that can-
not alter their status as a result of the construction characteristics.
Furthermore, the inert population could be interpreted as repre-
senting socially or geographically isolated dwellings that would
experience delays in exposure to new technologies or services. In
this case, as the household take-up of ESCO services increases this
isolated sub-population would become increasingly aware of the
available services due to their network of social contacts and posi-
tive word-of-mouth. To describe such phenomena, it will be
assumed that, as the proportion of the market captured by the
ESCOs (A or B) increases, the number of inert householdsdecreases, representing an increasing likelihood to purchase a con-
tract with an ESCO provider as a greater number of social contacts
migrate towards the ESCOs.
2.1. Model implementation
2.1.1. Agent initialisation
At time t ¼ 0, each company agent for k ¼ 1;2;3 is assigned a
ﬁxed contract length, ck, which remains constant for the duration
of the simulation. The traditional provider is initialised as the only
energy provider in the market, such that the ESCO providers have
zero customers at the outset. Furthermore, a contract with the tra-
ditional provider will be ﬁxed as the duration of a single model
iteration, such that customers are not removed from the market
but also cannot change provider twice in a single time-step. Initial
staff numbers, for both sales and services, must also be assigned to
each agent and these properties evolve as the market dynamics
evolve. Household agents are designated an energy efﬁciency,
which is randomly assigned by a user-supplied probability distri-
bution. All households are ﬂagged as on-market and are thus
immediately available for recruitment by the company agents.
The initial inert/active status of agents is randomly assigned by
declaring a ﬁxed probability of a household being inert.
2.1.2. Market dynamics
In each time interval of duration Dt, representing one model
iteration, each company makes contact with skðtÞYkDt random
households, where Yk is the average number of customers each
member of staff contacts per working day. The order in which com-
panies approach households is randomised to prevent any one
company form obtaining an advantage in the market. Households
ﬂagged as off-market or inert will always decline to upgrade efﬁ-
ciency and/or switch provider. If contacted by its current energy
provider, a household can choose to remain at its current efﬁciency
level or to move up the efﬁciency scale to a higher level. If con-
tacted by another company, a household can choose to remain
with its current company, move to the new company and remain
at its current efﬁciency level, or move to the new company and
move up the efﬁciency scale to a higher level, Fig. 1. This decision
is determined from an Attractiveness array. Switching company or
upgrading efﬁciency all evoke new contract periods.
To describe the Attractiveness array, it is ﬁrst noted that, for a
household to ascend the energy efﬁciency scale, more efﬁcient
insulation and appliances must be installed. An ESCO will absorb
the initial cost of this upgrade, which would subsequently be
repaid by the customer over the contract period. However, the tra-
ditional provider will not absorb this cost and it would thus fall to
the customer to self-ﬁnance the full upgrade cost during a single
model iteration. A potential customer will weigh the beneﬁts of
energy costs saved over the duration of the contract period against
the cost of an efﬁciency upgrade. The cost of a household increas-
ing its efﬁciency from level j to level i is denoted by Uj;i. It is
assumed that an ESCO can purchase identical appliances or insula-
tion products at a reduced wholesale cost. The cost of upgrading
can thus be written as dkUji, with d1 ¼ 1 and d2;3 < 1. The beneﬁt
to households of increasing efﬁciency level from j to i, while
remaining with the same provider, will satisfy
Bk;kj;i ¼ ck Pk 1
j
10
 
 Pk 1 i10
  
 dkUj;i
ck
:
The mean annual household energy bill with provider k is given
by Pk. ESCOs could sell energy at a fraction, lk¼2;3 < 1, of the price
available from the traditional provider, such that P2;3 < P1. The
beneﬁt of moving company from provider n to m and upgrading
efﬁciency from j to i is similarly calculated following
Fig. 1. Flowchart of household transitions.
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j
10
 
 Pm 1 i10
  
 dmUj;i
cm
;
and it is assumed that ESCOs sell energy to customers at the aver-
aged priced of P2;3 ¼ P1ð1þ l2;3Þ=2. Finally the beneﬁt of moving
and/or upgrading is converted to the attractiveness of each option
via An;mj;i ¼ expðrBn;mj;i Þ where r represents the relative attractiveness
to a customer of each possibility based on the corresponding ﬁnan-
cial beneﬁt. Each household views the attractiveness of the possible
options available to it and makes its decision with a probability
determined from the relative magnitudes of the attractiveness of
each option. Finally, the price of energy P1, is implemented as an
external forcing effect, such that it is assumed to be independent
of market dynamics and grows exponentially at a rate e.
At the end of each market iteration, companies adjust their sales
and service staff to account for changes in the market. Each com-
pany possesses predeﬁned staff parameters qk and ck, which repre-
sent the service staff required to supply 1 million customers and
the idealised number of households that a single sales person
would be assigned in order to capture the available market, respec-
tively. The available market is deﬁned as the number of households
not currently under contract, and thus ﬂagged as on-market. Ser-
vice staff numbers are adjusted, to account for the increased/
decreased service demand due to an increase/decrease in customer
numbers, as follows
pkðt þ DtÞ ¼ pkðtÞ þ qk Hkðt þ DtÞ  HkðtÞ
h i
106:
Sales staff are updated based on the magnitude of the available
market. Ideally, and without ﬁnancial limits, companies would
adjust their sales staff so as to have the ability to contact all poten-
tial customers. However, the number of sales staff that a company
may acquire will be limited by its available funds. This is imple-
mented by assuming that the ability to adjust sales staff numbers
is limited by the company’s share in the market, which yields
skðt þ DtÞ ¼ skðtÞ þ Dmarket 1 H
kðt þ DtÞ
HðtÞ
 !
Hkðt þ DtÞ
HðtÞ ;
where Dmarket ¼ Hon-marketðt þ DtÞ  Hon-marketðtÞ. A minimum number
of sales staff, smink is always maintained.
The percentage of inert households is assumed to decrease
exponentially, as the fraction of the market captured by the ESCOs
increases, at a rate of R ¼  lnðIa=I0Þ, where Ia is the percentage ofhouseholds that will always remain inert and cannot upgrade their
energy efﬁciency due to, for example, their construction, Fig. 2. In
addition, a percentage, I0, of households are designated as inert
when the total ESCO market share is identically zero, which is
assumed to be the initial market structure at time t ¼ 0. Thus, at
each iteration, the number of houses that become active is
I0 e
R
P3
k¼2H
k ðtÞ
HðtÞ  eR
P3
k¼2H
k ðtþDtÞ
HðtÞ
" #
HðtÞ
100
; ð1Þ
and the newly active status is applied to randomly selected formerly
inert houses. Once activated, a household remains in this state for-
ever. Finally, the household population grows by h=Dt in each iter-
ation. By default, all newly created houses are assigned to the
traditional energy provider with an efﬁciency level uniformly dis-
tributed in the range 4 to 7, ﬂagged as on-market and have a prob-
ability of I0100 of being inert.3. Market scenario
The model applied to a hypothetical household population of
Hð0Þ ¼ 28 106 houses is considered. For computational efﬁ-
ciency, a scaling factor of 103 is adopted, so that each household
agent represents 103 physical households. Initially, all household
energy is supplied by the traditional provider, H1ð0Þ ¼ Hð0Þ. In
addition, each household is randomly assigned an energy efﬁciency
level, distributed as in Fig. 3. Furthermore, all houses are ﬂagged as
on-market and have a probability of Ia=100 ¼ 0:6 to be ﬂagged as
inert. A minimum of I0 ¼ 2% of all households will always remain
inert. The household population will grow by h ¼ 105 houses per
year.
At time t ¼ 0, the mean cost of a household’s annual energy
usage with the traditional provider is assumed to be
P1ð0Þ ¼ £2400. This is allowed to grow exponentially over time
following
P1ðtÞ ¼ P1ð0Þeet;
where e ¼ 0:02 is the annual rate of growth in the mean household
energy bill and represents a 100% increase in the cost of household
energy costs over a period of approximately 35 years. It is assumed
that the ESCOs could sell energy to their customers at 30% less than
the traditional provider (l2;3 ¼ 0:7), so that the average annual
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Fig. 2. The change in the percentage of inert households as a function of the total ESCO market share (ESCO A + ESCO B). (a) Percentage of households always inert is ﬁxed at
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Fig. 3. Initial energy efﬁciency probability distribution of households.
Table 2
Parameters and values used in the numerical simulations.
Parameter Description Value
Hð0Þ Initial number of houses 28 106
I0 Initial percentage of inert houses 60%
Ia Percentage of houses always inert 2%
h Household growth rate 105 year1
P1ð0Þ Initial annual energy costs £2400
e Annual energy cost growth rate 0:02 year1
lk Proportion of energy costs ½1; 0:7; 0:7
dk Proportion of upgrade costs ½1; 0:7; 0:7
ck Contract length in years ½0:25; 5; 10
skð0Þ Initial sales staff ½10; 200; 200
pkð0Þ Initial service staff ½250; 1000; 1000
qk Service staff to supply 106 houses ½10; 100; 100
ck Idealised houses per sales person ½104; 104; 104
Yk Households contacted per sales person ½20; 20; 20 day1
U0 Cost of ﬁrst 10% efﬁciency upgrade £400
r Relative attractiveness of upgrades 104
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assumed that ESCOs can upgrade household energy efﬁciency at
70% the cost of self-ﬁnancing (d2;3 ¼ 0:7). The cost of upgrading to
more efﬁcient insulation and appliances will be calculated using
the function
Uji ¼ U0 91ðj iÞð10 jÞð10 iÞ þ 1 ; ð2Þ
where U0 ¼ £400 is the cost of attaining the ﬁrst 10% improvement.
This ad hoc choice of function yields a relatively slow increase in cost
to attain the lower efﬁciency levels but displays rapidly increasing
costs inorder toattain thehighest energyefﬁciency levels. Theattrac-
tiveness of all options is then calculated with r ¼ 104.
As a base case scenario, a market where both ESCO A and ESCO
B adopt identical business strategies and differ only in the duration
of the contract they offer to customers is ﬁrst considered. As previ-
ously stated, the traditional provider does not impose a long term
contract and households are only retained under contract for a sin-
gle model iteration, taken as 3 months, such that c1 ¼ Dt ¼ 3
months. Contract lengths of c2 ¼ 5 years and c3 ¼ 10 years are
imposed by ESCO A and B, respectively. At the outset, ESCOs have
no customers, however, they require an established service staff to
facilitate potential customers. The business model of the ESCO,
whereby they install and maintain appliances and insulation,requires a larger service staff than the traditional provider. In addi-
tion, the traditional provider requires a minimal sales staff team as
it already has 100% of the market and initially aims to retain its
customer base rather than attract new customers. Therefore, staff
numbers are initialised as skð0Þ ¼ ½10; 200; 200 and pkð0Þ ¼
½250; 1000; 1000. We set qk ¼ ½10; 103; 103 and ck ¼ 104; 8k,
and a minimum of smink ¼ 1 sales staff is maintained by all compa-
nies. Finally, each sales person contacts Yk ¼ ½20; 20; 20 house-
holds per day. All parameter values used in the simulations are
summarised in Table 2 and the model is run over a period of
40 years. The probabilistic nature of agent behaviour yields a
unique output for each distinct simulation of the model and the
mean of 100 stochastic realisations is calculated to describe the
averaged market behaviour over time. Conﬁdence intervals are
then determined to indicate how the mean behaviour of the mar-
ket can ﬂuctuate between model realisations.4. Results
4.1. Fixed ESCO business model
The energy needs of the total household population is initially,
at time t ¼ 0, supplied by the traditional provider. However,
68%
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Fig. 4. Base case model scenario. The mean percentage of the household market captured by each energy provider at 10 year increments, averaged over 100 realisations. The
error bars represent the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Fig. 5. Base case model scenario. Time series of energy provider performance, averaged over 100 realisations. The shaded areas denotes the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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Fig. 4. The invasion of ESCOs into the energy supply market occurs
quite rapidly during the ﬁrst 20 years and the rate at which the tra-
ditional provider loses customers begins to decline thereafter, with
the performance of ESCO A and B displaying greater divergence at
later times. The slower growth rate in ESCO customer numbers at
later years is the result of households being tied into long term
contracts, thus limiting the potential customer pool. The number
of customers with the traditional provider decreases monotoni-
cally over the 40 year period, while those of the ESCO providers
increase, Fig. 5(a). ESCO B is the more successful of the two by
attaining a larger share of the market. This can be attributed to
the longer contract period (10 years) and the resultant lowerannual energy costs incurred by households as a result of spread-
ing the costs of energy efﬁciency upgrades over this longer time
period, which makes ESCO B a more attractive option to potential
customers. Sales staff numbers mirror the available pool of cus-
tomers, determined from the number of households ﬂagged as
on-market, Fig. 5(b). All providers initially decrease sales staff due
to the reduction in potential customers, Fig. 5(d), as households
sign long term contracts with the ESCOs which takes them off
the market. This reduction is initially negligible due to the limita-
tion imposed on the ability to increase/decrease sales staff num-
bers due to the size of a company’s market share. Therefore,
while ESCOs have a large potential customer base, they do not
modify sales staff numbers due to their insufﬁcient market share.
Fig. 6. Base case model scenario. Distribution of the energy efﬁciency of households signed with the traditional provider, ESCO A and ESCO B after a 40 year period of time and
averaged over 100 realisations. The shaded areas denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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Fig. 7. Base case model scenario. Bar chart displaying the number of times
households change energy provider during a 40 year period, averaged over 100
realisations. The error bars indicate the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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bers as it already has the majority of the market. Service staff are
seen to increase in line with customer numbers, with the tradi-
tional company maintaining minimum staff numbers once ESCOs
start to dominate the market, Fig. 5(c). Finally, the number of
houses ﬂagged as on-market decreases during the initial 10 year
period, as customers sign contracts with the ESCO providers,
Fig. 5(d). Following this initial period of decline, numbers start to
increase again as contracts begin to expire.
The energy efﬁciency distribution of households contracted to
each of the three providers after 40 years is shown in Fig. 6. The
traditional provider customer base exhibits a slow migration
towards the higher efﬁciency levels, with the middle levels of
50–70% being more attractive (compare with the initial distribu-
tion seen in Fig. 3). The ESCO customer base displays a markedly
different pattern with households migrating towards higher efﬁ-
ciency levels, peaking at 90% efﬁciency. The prohibitively high cost
of attaining 100% efﬁciency, assumed in Eq. (2), restricts the move-
ment of households towards the 100% level. Some traditional
households always stay in the lowest efﬁciency levels, represent-
ing the inert houses that are unable or unwilling to upgrade their
energy efﬁciency. The number of times each household changes
energy provider is also recorded, Fig. 7. The majority of households
switch provider once and only a small minority switch 4 times over
the 40 year period. No households were found to switch more than
4 times. A small portion of the households that never change pro-
vider is accounted for by the 2% of households that always remain
inert (I0), however, the majority of households that did not switch
did, nevertheless, upgraded their efﬁciency level with the same
energy provider, Fig. 6.Once a contract period expires with an ESCO, a household has
the possibility of once again changing provider, either to the other
ESCO or to the traditional provider. However, it is found that many
households choose to remain with the ESCOs beyond the initial
contract period. The majority of households signed to the ESCOs
spend between 0 and 20 years ﬂagged as on-market, Fig. 8(a). This
implies some level of stability within the market whereby ESCOs
retain customers and households do not immediately switch pro-
vider when contracts expire. This is similarly reﬂected when the
time households spend off-market is considered, Fig. 8(b). In this
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Fig. 8. Base case model scenario. Bar charts displaying (a) the number of years that households spend on-market while signed to an ESCO (i.e. not under contract) and (b) the
number of years that households spend off-market. The error bars indicate the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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contracts with ESCOs for more than 15 years of the 40 year simula-
tion period. This indicates that only a minority of households sign
new contracts in immediate succession.4.2. Variable ESCO business model
On consideration of the parameters listed in Table 2, it is evi-
dent that they can be separated into two distinct classes: market
speciﬁc parameters and company speciﬁc parameters. The former
directly impact the behaviour and properties of the household pop-
ulation and the latter represent the business strategies of the dif-
ferent providers. For example, the market parameters form the
subset ½Ia; I0; e; P1ð0Þ; r;U0 and they inform the model about inert
households, annual household energy costs and household views
on efﬁciency upgrades. In contrast, the company parameters form
the subset ½dk;lk; ck; skð0Þ; pkð0Þ;qk;Yk and these directly impact
the stafﬁng policies and business operations of the different energy
providers for k 2 ½1;2;3. Considering both of these parameter sub-
sets, a sensitivity analysis of the model was conducted. The com-
pany market share was adopted as the quantitative indicator of
business success and the impact of variations in input parameters
on the ﬁnal market shares was investigated. Individual parameters
were varied by ±20% and the resultant change in market share
from the base case scenario was recorded.
Firstly, with all company speciﬁc parameters ﬁxed at the values
given in Table 2, the market parameters were varied in order to
ascertain the possible consequences of different market properties
and to identify the parameter variations to which the model is
most sensitive. The market share achieved by each energy provider
after 25 years was recorded, with this time interval chosen to
reduce computational time. Fig. 9 displays the market share
achieved by each of the providers, where the bar charts are centred
around the base case scenario. The model is clearly most sensitive
to variations in the initial number of inert households, I0. A 20%
increase or decrease in this parameter results in the ESCO provid-
ers capturing signiﬁcantly more or less of the market respectively.
This outcome is the result of the assumed household activation
rate (see Eq. (1)) and can be interpreted as follows. If the initial
proportion of inert households is decreased, the rate at which
households become active also decreases (Fig. 2) which reduces
the potential ESCO customer pool and would inevitably slow the
migration of the market towards the ESCO providers and ulti-
mately result in a smaller market share being achieved. Similarly,
when the initial proportion of inert households is increased therate at which households become active increases which has the
effect of creating a larger market of potential customers for the
ESCO providers more rapidly which results in a greater market
share being achieved. Variations in the other market parameters
have little impact on the ﬁnal provider’s market share, with 20%
parameter variations resulting in less than 1% market variation.
A further sensitivity analysis was conducted to investigate the
effect of ESCO providers altering their business strategies. First,
the impact of ESCO A altering its deﬁning parameter set was con-
sidered, Fig. 10. The majority of company parameters were found
to exert little inﬂuence in the ﬁnal market shares. However, varia-
tions in the sales strategy yielded a different market structure.
ESCO A achieved a larger market share by either increasing its ini-
tial sales staff, s2ð0Þ, or the staff daily household contact rate, Y2.
This increased market share came at the expense of the other pro-
viders, which had quantitatively similar decreases in their respec-
tive market shares. Conversely, decreasing the sales speciﬁc
parameters yielded a lower market share for ESCO A, as would
be expected. However, the quantitatively similar resultant increase
in the other providers market share indicates that, despite the
more attractive energy bills available to the customers of ESCO B,
the traditional provider is still able to compete for customers and
maintain a substantial share of the market. Qualitatively similar
results are obtained by varying the business strategy of ESCO B,
Fig. 11. Perhaps surprisingly, variations in the proportionate costs
of energy and efﬁciency upgrades (lk and dk) did not have a signif-
icant impact on the ESCO performance. Thus, it would seem that
the household energy bill reductions achieved by spreading the
cost of upgrades over the contract period has more of an impact
on customer choice than the reduced price that ESCOs can offer
for energy supplies. In summary, the optimal business model for
ESCOs, under the current model assumptions, would be to adopt
more aggressive sales and/or marketing strategies.5. Discussion
In this paper an agent-based model for the establishment of
energy service companies in the household market has been pre-
sented. The more service orientated business model adopted by
these companies can help to improve household energy efﬁciencies,
thus reducing overall energy usage and carbon emissions in this
sector. The agent construct allows the model to be structured
around a heterogeneous household population composing the con-
sumer market, which have unique characteristics and decision
making abilities achieved through a probabilistic framework. In
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provider to investigate competition in the market. The interactions
between energy providers and customers (i.e. households) is pri-
marily deﬁned by a company’s sales strategy, which in turn is deter-
mined by the company-speciﬁc staff mechanisms and dynamics.
There are many business models and strategies that energy pro-
viders could adopt which greatly inﬂuence market performance
and success. In the agent framework, such strategies are expressed
as rules, unpinning the mechanisms by which companies react to
changes in the market and interact with other agent entities. A
base case market scenario was established, in which all providers
adopt identical business operations and differ only in the length
of the initial contract period. This is a fundamental property for
businesses as deﬁned in the model, as it determines the duration
of time over which household energy efﬁciency upgrades must
be repaid, which in turn directly determines annual household
energy costs. This scenario displays a market behaviour in which
households migrate toward the ESCOs while also upgrading their
energy efﬁciencies. Households that choose to remain with the tra-
ditional provider, or indeed return after an ECSO contract, demon-
strate an aversion to the upper efﬁciency levels due to the high
costs associated with self-ﬁnanced improvements. In a global
economy, determined to reduce carbon emissions, self-ﬁnancing
is a limiting factor in improving the energy efﬁciency and usage
in the residential housing sector. The model does not account for
household income and ﬁnancial status, with the underlying
assumption being that the attractiveness of upgrading is deter-
mined from the cost of upgrading. Therefore, an attractive upgrade
can be undertaken without regard to the household ability to pay
for that upgrade. The impact of this assumption would be more
pronounced in the traditional provider’s customers as the total
upgrade cost must be paid immediately (in a single model itera-
tion). The deﬁnition of the ESCO contract, where upgrade costs
are dispersed over long periods of time, dampens this effect. There-
fore, the impact of the self-ﬁnancing limitation would undoubtedlybe more pronounced in the traditional customer efﬁciency distri-
bution when household income is considered. The model could
be adapted to include national data on household income, essen-
tially creating an agent-speciﬁc attractiveness array scaled by the
household ability to ﬁnance efﬁciency upgrades. Another factor
to be considered is consumer aversion to long-term contracts,
which could bias the market towards companies offering shorter
contract periods. It was found that a larger market share was
attained by ECSO B, which imposed a contract period exactly dou-
ble that of ESCO A. Both ESCO providers purchase energy at the
same price and the ability to sell energy to customers at reduced
costs is determined by the repayment period for efﬁciency
upgrades. ECSO B allows customers to repay over a 10 year period
which reduces short term energy costs and establishes ECSO B as a
more attractive ﬁnancial option. However, a household’s decision
to purchase would be jointly inﬂuenced by cost savings and con-
tract duration. For example, ﬁrst time buyers may be hesitant to
get locked into a 10 year energy provision contract. Similar aver-
sions would apply to other social groups such as pensioners, ten-
ants and landlords. The agent-speciﬁc attractiveness array could
again be modiﬁed to account for individual customer preferences
regarding contract durations, which could be implemented from
suitable data or using a scaling factor to incorporate an increasing
aversion with increasing contract duration. Finally, cost alone is
not the sole factor that inﬂuences household attractiveness to
more efﬁcient energy usage. Environmental awareness and a desire
to reduce individual carbon footprints is an important element that
could drive the invasion of ESCOs, as described here, into the
energy provision market. The versatility of the attractiveness array
structure would allow such inﬂuences to be incorporated at the
agent level by assigning an environmental awareness scaling factor
to individual household agents.
An element of stability was observed in the market dynamics,
with the majority of households changing energy provider less
than twice during the 40 year simulated period. In addition, a large
M. Robinson et al. / Energy Conversion and Management 94 (2015) 233–244 243portion of households spent over 15 years as ESCO customers but
not locked into a contract. This demonstrates the ESCO’s ability
to retain customers on contract expiration and also reﬂects the
apathetic nature of many consumers who choose the convenience
of inaction and do not seek more competitive options. An impor-
tant element that may inﬂuence the observed stability may be
the external forcing provided by the annual mean household
energy costs. A conveniently simplistic model was adopted to
describe the evolution of energy costs over time, which was imple-
mented as an exponentially increasing market-extraneous vari-
able. Indeed, this variable is a complex function of individual
demand, resource availability, market dynamics, government poli-
cies and taxes, in addition to highly involved interconnections with
other infrastructure systems, such as transportation and water. A
monotonically increasing cost, as assumed herein, may not reﬂect
the persistent ﬂuctuations on shorter time scales or future trends
which may emerge due to stricter controls on carbon emissions,
depletion of natural resources, emerging economies or the increas-
ing demands for personal electronic devices. An additional consid-
eration in this context is the simulated model time frame, chosen
as 40 years, over which the annual household energy costs steadily
increase. Increasing global temperatures may result in reduced
future demand for household heating. However, economic markets
operate on time scales inﬁnitely shorter than those of the earth’s
climate. The ﬁnancial consequences of curbing carbon emissions
in the short term, through improving energy efﬁciency, may not
be immediately realised in energy costs due to the phenomenon
of committed warming resulting from the long time scales associ-
ated with the thermal inertia of the oceans and ice sheets [26].
Moreover, future reductions in the widespread availability of oil
and gas may shift the economy towards costly alternatives [27],
necessitating large injections of capital to provide energy security
which could result in periods of rapid cost inﬂation. Acknowledg-
ing the substantial uncertainties associated with future energy
costs, we conclude that a steadily increasing energy cost over a
maximum simulation time of 40 years is adequate for the scope
of this work and, with a lack of deﬁnitive knowledge on future
energy costs, we adopted this elementary approach to capture
the market response to the, seemingly inevitable, future increasing
costs of household energy requirements.
An important component absent from the model is the eco-
nomic performance of the energy providers. In its absence, busi-
ness success is based on customer numbers achieved. The model
investigates the role of ESCOs in the migration towards a more
energy efﬁcient residential sector and the complexities of business
competition in a real work economy are beyond the scope of the
present work. However, with detailed data on ESCO business prac-
tices, such as realistic work force size, employee salaries, services
offered and operational costs, the dynamics of the energy provider
agents could be modiﬁed to operate on a monetary basis. In the
absence of such data, business performance is evaluated on market
share, which is assumed to directly inﬂuence a company’s ability to
restructure its work force to adapt to the evolving energy market.
Another issue compounding the integration of economics into the
present model is the evolving technological and regulatory charac-
ter of the energy production sector. To accurately capture this
dynamic business domain the provider agents would need to adapt
to newly emerging technologies, in terms of both production costs
and work force (e.g. provide training to service staff on new tech-
nologies). Business operations (i.e. agent rules) would also need to
adapt to changes in legislation and governmental policies or taxes.
The model presented in this work represents a preliminary
foundation on which to evaluate the migration of the residential
sector to a more energy efﬁcient performance. The model is versa-
tile and can be improved and adapted, incorporating other effects
into the attractiveness array structure. Future developments couldinclude the addition of multi-utility service companies providing
additional services to households, such as water and
communications.6. Conclusions
An agent-based model was developed to examine the potential
of energy service companies (ESCOs) to contribute to the large
scale upgrading of household energy efﬁciency. The attractiveness
of this service model is inﬂuenced by the duration of the contract
offered, which enables households to spread the costs of upgrades
over longer periods of time. It could also enable the ESCO to
recover the initial cost of service contract set up and to negotiate
lower rates with domestic technology providers for efﬁcient equip-
ment. Self-ﬁnancing of energy upgrades, necessitated by customers
of traditional utility providers, is a limiting factor to widespread
efﬁciency improvements. Future rises in energy costs favour the
ESCO business model, with customers achieving greater cost sav-
ings with increasing energy prices. This could also encourage
demand side management behaviours for domestic consumers in
order not to be penalised for use outside contracted consumption
rates. A greater focus on providing energy services, as opposed to
consumable products, presents a viable approach to reducing
future energy costs and consumption.Acknowledgements
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